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Research summary 
This paper explores the impact of family and professional managers on performance and how this 
relationship is affected by international and product diversification. Using a dataset of 262 German 
firms from 2000 to 2009, we find that an increasing proportion of family managers on the 
management board is associated with higher performance. This relationship is negatively 
moderated by higher levels of international diversification but reinforced by increased product 
diversification due to differences in the human and social capital between family and professional 
managers. Firms with a significant presence of family members on the top management team 
(TMT) face a choice of either adopting a corporate strategy that runs counter to “global-focusing” 
or adjusting the balance of family and professional managers in the TMT.  
Managerial summary 
Deciding the extent of family involvement on the executive team is a key strategic decision. While 
our research supports the general proposition that family managers will enhance performance we 
show they don't have the same positive impact in all situations. More precisely, we show that family 
managers are more suited to lead diversification than internationalization. If a family firm wants to 
go international it therefore is sensible to increase the proportion of professional managers on the 
executive team. Diversifying into new product markets, however, does not require outside expertise 
commonly associated with professional managers. 
Introduction 
Is the effect of family managers on performance positive or negative when compared to the impact 
of professional managers? Increasingly research is suggesting that the answer to this critical 
question depends on understanding the contextual factors that affect the relationship between the 
involvement of family and professional managers and performance (Chang & Shim, 2015; Miller, 
Le Breton-Miller, Minichilli et al., 2014; Wright, Chrisman, Chua et al., 2014). A firm’s levels of 
international and product diversification constitute such key contextual factors as they shape the 
specific strategic and administrative challenges that family and professional managers are faced 
with (D’Angelo, Majocchi, & Buck, 2016; Gomez-Mejia, Makri, & Kintana, 2010; Sciascia, 
Mazzola, & Chirico, 2013). In contrast to many other contextual factors considered previously 
(Miller, Minichilli, & Corbetta, 2013), both aspects of corporate scope are more directly affected 
by strategic choices. Understanding their impact is thus of particular importance. In this paper we 
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therefore explore how the relationship between the involvement of family and professional 
managers and performance is shaped by international and product diversification. Increased 
international diversification, as we will argue, can be detrimental to the benefits of family mangers 
whilst product diversification can enhance these benefits. 
Conceptually, we focus on the different resources that family and professional managers offer to 
the firm in terms of their respective managerial human and social capital. Such resources have been 
used to explore the impact of family and professional managers on family firm internationalization 
(D’Angelo et al., 2016; Kontinen & Ojala, 2011a, 2011b; Kraus, Mensching, Calabrò et al., 2016) 
as well as family firm performance (Sanchez-Famoso, Akhter, Iturralde et al., 2015). Differences 
in a firms’ endowment with these complementary and competitively relevant resources (Acquaah, 
2012; Geletkanycz, Boyd, & Finkelstein, 2001) are expected to influence strategy and performance 
outcomes, particularly at the level of the top management team (TMT) (Minichilli, Corbetta, & 
MacMillan, 2010). The effect on performance is, however, likely to differ depending on the extent 
of international and product diversification. Notably, the human and social capital of family 
managers is typically locally rooted and grounded in relatively tight sets of relationships and 
communalities (König, Kammerlander, & Enders, 2013). This suggests that family managers are 
well positioned to manage firms as long as these are neither highly diversified nor internationalized 
but the question arises how their impact on performance, compared to that of professional 
managers, changes when levels of international and product diversification increase. 
Internationalization presents a particular challenge to family managers as the “diversity of national 
contexts in terms of consumers’ behaviours, legal and administrative requirements, and market 
conditions increase significantly the complexity that managers should handle” (D’Angelo et al., 
2016: 4). While product diversification also increases strategic and administrative complexity, 
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family managers can leverage their social and human capital across product-market domains more 
easily. Specifically, we hypothesize that a greater representation of family, rather than professional 
managers, on the TMT will impact negatively on performance in internationally diversified firms 
whereas the reverse is true for product diversification. Contributing to efforts in resource-based 
theory to better understand the contextual factors that shape the performance benefits of resources 
(Barney & Mackey, 2016; Lioukas, Reuer, & Zollo, 2016; Nyberg, Moliterno, Hale Jr et al., 2014; 
Teece, 2011) we find support for these hypotheses using a panel data set of 262 German firms from 
2000 to 2009.  
This study extends recent research on the role of family in the context of internationalization by 
considering performance implications (Arregle, Naldi, Nordqvist et al., 2012; Calabrò, Torchia, 
Pukall et al., 2013; Kraus et al., 2016; Zahra, 2003). Thereby it contributes to recent efforts to 
better understand how contextual factors shape the relationship between family management and 
performance (Miller et al., 2013). It shows that choices related to corporate strategy – i.e. the 
decision to internationalize or diversify – affect this relationship and hence performance. It thus 
sets decisions about the involvement of professional and family managers in the wider strategic 
and organizational context (D’Angelo et al., 2016) and demonstrates that the involvement of family 
and professional managers on the TMT and choices about a firms’ corporate strategy should be 
considered jointly. In doing so we respond to calls to better assess the heterogeneity of family 
involvement (Kraus et al., 2016; Pukall & Calabrò, 2014) and the impact of TMT attributes on 
performance (Cooper, Patel, & Thatcher, 2014; Mihalache, Jansen, Van Den Bosch et al., 2012).  
Our theoretical approach complements earlier studies exploring the impact of contextual factors 
which built on agency and stewardship considerations (Banalieva & Eddleston, 2011; Chang et al., 
2015; Miller et al., 2013) by focusing on the managerial resources and capabilities of the TMT as 
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important factors in a firms’ competitive success (Acquaah, 2012; Hambrick, Humphrey, & Gupta, 
2015; Hutzschenreuter & Horstkotte, 2013). This contributes to resource-based theorizing about 
the performance consequences of family management (Gedajlovic, Carney, Chrisman et al., 2012; 
Sirmon & Hitt, 2003) by establishing how contextual factors affect the performance benefits of the 
key resources of managerial and social capital contributed by family and professional managers. 
Specifically, we show that, when considering profitability, firms with significant presence of 
family members on the TMT face a choice of either adopting a corporate strategy that runs counter 
to the typical “global-focusing” approach (Meyer, 2006) or adjusting the balance of family and 
professional managers in the TMT. 
 
Theory and Hypothesis Development 
Differences in the managerial and social capital of family and professional managers 
Previous research suggests that the TMT constitutes a key competitive resource of the firm and that 
managers’ endowment of managerial human and social capital is central to their impact on 
performance (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Hitt, Biermant, Shimizu et al., 2001). To the extent that family 
and professional managers differ systematically in the human and social capital they contribute to 
the firm, we can expect differences in their involvement in the management of the firm to be 
reflected in performance outcomes (Acquaah, 2012; Banalieva, Eddleston, & Zellweger, 2015; 
Castanias & Helfat, 2001; Sirmon et al., 2003) particularly at the level of the TMT (Haynes & 
Hillman, 2010; Sundaramurthy, Pukthuanthong, & Kor, 2014). 
Human capital reflects the managerial skills and knowledge that are acquired through learning 
(Adner et al., 2003; Hitt et al., 2001; Kor & Mesko, 2013). A number of factors lead family 
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managers to acquire human capital that can impact positively on performance in comparison to 
professional managers. Family managers often gain early and deep exposure to the family firm and 
develop a significant stock of knowledge and skills (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Miller & Le Breton-
Miller, 2005; Miller et al., 2013) which is typically enhanced through longer terms in office (Miller 
& Le-Breton Miller, 2006). Family managers are therefore likely to acquire greater levels of firm 
specific expertise and tacit knowledge that can be used to enhance value creation in the firm 
(Acquaah, 2012; Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Desender, Aguilera, Crespi et al., 2013; Raheja, 2005; 
Sirmon et al., 2003). Early and close involvement in the firm thus helps family managers to develop 
valuable human capital, including firm specific skills that can be expected to impact positively on 
firm performance. This effect can be enhanced further in TMTs characterized by a substantial 
involvement of family managers due to the effect of positive group dynamics (Ensley & Pearson, 
2005; Sirmon et al., 2003). A greater involvement of family managers on the TMT can, however, 
also lead to negative consequences. Nepotism can lead to the appointment of managers with 
insufficient human capital. Family members may invest less in education and training as they rely 
on a lifetime guarantee of holding their management position (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2006). Such 
effects can also impact on professional managers who can take this as a signal of closed routes to 
promotion leading talented managers to exit the organization or limit their effort (Bertrand et al., 
2006). In contrast to family managers, professional managers on the TMT are selected from a larger 
pool of managerial talent (Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003; Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, 
Jacobson et al., 2007b; Villalonga & Amit, 2006) and will typically be more experienced when 
appointed to senior positions (Pérez-González, 2006). As a result of the more intensive competitive 
selection process, professional managers will thus, on average, possess greater generic managerial 
human capital and managerial talent (Chang et al., 2015) and offer a wider range of capabilities 
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(Yildirim-Öktem & Üsdiken, 2010) although the human capital of individual family managers may 
be equal to, or greater than that of individual professional managers. 
Social capital is the set of social relationships that gives an individual influence as well as access 
to knowledge, information and resources (Acquaah, 2012; Adner et al., 2003; Sundaramurthy et 
al., 2014). Although interdependent (Kor et al., 2013), social capital differs from human capital in 
that it is established through “investment in and maintenance of social networks rather than 
investments in personal attributes” (Sauerwald, Lin, & Peng, 2016: 501). A number of factors 
differentiate the social capital of family managers from that of professional managers. First, family 
managers are able to draw on often long established relationships that cut across the family and 
firm domains (Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Habbershon, Williams, & MacMillan, 2003; Miller 
et al., 2013), creating the potential for “unique and abundant” social capital (Pearson, Carr, & 
Shaw, 2008). Second, family managers are more likely to be perceived by external stakeholders as 
speaking for the firm (Miller, Lee, Chang et al., 2009; Miller et al., 2013), leading to unique and 
close ties to internal and external stakeholders (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). Third, as 
social networks are developed over time (Sauerwald et al., 2016) and networks and 
interrelationships are often defining characteristics of families (König et al., 2013), the social 
capital of individual family managers, and that of the family as a collective, are mutually 
reinforcing and interdependent. The continuity provided by family managers thereby enables them 
to more effectively maintain, exploit and develop these networks (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006; 
Sirmon et al., 2003). In the terminology of the resource-based view this makes family based social 
capital imperfectly imitable and therefore a potential source for competitive advantage (Pearson et 
al., 2008).  
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The social capital of family managers can therefore generate a substantial positive impact on 
performance. It is not without limitations, however. First, the very “established” and interconnected 
nature of family social capital can hinder innovativeness and renewal (Berrone et al., 2012) and 
limit its utility in rapidly changing contexts (Acquaah, 2012). Second, although individual family 
managers will offer variations in the social capital they bring to the firm, the overlaps between the 
social capital of family managers will be greater than amongst professional managers. A greater 
involvement of professional managers is thus able to broaden the range of social capital available 
to the firm. Third, as professional managers will be selected for their role through a more 
competitive process, there is greater likelihood that the social capital of the appointee can be 
aligned with the needs of the firm than is the case with family managers.  
Overall, family and professional managers are thus likely to differ in terms of the human and social 
capital they offer a firm. We can therefore expect the relative prevalence of family and professional 
managers on the TMT to affect performance. A greater involvement of professional managers can 
increase the breadth and diversity of human and social capital available to the firm. This will cover 
a wider range of a firms’ managerial and competitive requirements, an important factor in the 
ability to leverage performance benefits from the available social and human capital (Kor et al., 
2013) and, similar to the effects of increased “board capital”, may lead to positive performance 
effects (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Sundaramurthy et al., 2014). These potential benefits of 
professional managers may, however, be curtailed in a number of ways. First, an important caveat 
is that the selection of professional managers in family firms can itself be biased, as the fit with the 
family is likely to be a particular consideration. Limitations that family managers face are likely to 
be shared – at least in part – by professional managers when the ability to work with the family 
matters more than qualifications. Where this is the case, the potential advantages associated with 
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the selection of professional managers will be limited. Second, investment by families in the 
development of family managers through education and training can offset some of the advantages 
generated by the greater pool of professional managers. (Aguilera & Crespi-Cladera, 2012; Pérez-
González, 2006). 
Whilst the potential generic advantages of professional managers can therefore be reduced, there 
is less scope for professional managers to overcome key advantages of family managers. 
Professional managers are unlikely for example to be perceived by external stakeholders as 
speaking for the firm and therefore will not be able to build the same unique and close ties as family 
managers. Even when professional managers are chosen to fit the family, family managers are 
likely to offer greater levels of firm specific human capital and highly developed social capital that 
can underpin informational and relational competitive advantage (Gedajlovic et al., 2012).  
 Given the difficulty of replicating the benefits of family mangers’ human and social capital the 
overall effect of a higher proportion of family managers on performance is thus more likely to be 
positive. Recent empirical studies from Miller et al. (2013) and Kowalewski et al. (2010) point in 
a similar direction as they show the positive impact of family CEOs on performance. It is also in 
line with the spirit of the more general argument that family firms outperform non-family firms 
(see meta-analysis of 380 studies by Wagner, Block, Miller et al., 2015 for evidence).  Hence, we 
offer the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: A higher proportion of family members on the TMT has a positive impact on 
firm performance. 
Although there is cause to expect a positive relationship between family management and 
performance, this will not be true in all situations (Miller et al., 2014; 2013). Notably, the baseline 
account of the relationship between family management involvement and performance does not 
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capture the possible effect that different contextual settings may have on the value of the human 
and social capital offered by family and professional managers. International and product 
diversification constitute two central strategic choices that shape such contextual conditions 
(Carpenter, 2002). In the following we therefore introduce and explore how these factors affect the 
impact that human and social capital offered by family and professional managers may have on 
performance in order to ask under which contextual conditions family or professional management 
is more likely to have a more positive effect. 
Family management, performance and international diversification 
A key consequence of international diversification is that it increases managerial complexity 
(Alessandri & Seth, 2014; Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997; Singla, Veliyath, & George, 2014). As 
international diversification leads family managers into areas “where they are inexperienced new 
players” (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010: 229) and may lack the necessary skills (Zahra, 2003), the value 
of the highly specific human capital of family managers can be diminished. It may even turn into 
a “hindrance” (Bhaumik, Driffield, & Pal, 2010) reducing, for example, the ability to “recognize 
and utilize unfamiliar knowledge” (Kor et al., 2013: 240). Moreover, while some family managers 
may have an international outlook and offer substantial international experience, the availability of 
the highly complex and specific skills required by internationalization (Graves & Thomas, 2008) 
in a given family, is likely to be more limited than in the open market of professional managers, 
particularly as families are often characterized by a strong attachment to the business culture of its 
home country (Bhaumik et al., 2010). This means that while it may be possible to draw on family 
managers with appropriate human and social capital at lower levels of internationalization, the 
likelihood to find family managers with appropriate profiles will decrease with increasing levels of 
international diversification. 
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Increasing international diversification can, additionally, dilute the benefits of family specific 
social capital. Drivers of family social capital are stability of the family nucleus and dynasty, 
frequent interactions among family members, interdependence, and closure (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon 
et al., 2007). Such social capital can be most readily established and leveraged if firms are not 
internationally diversified or only to a limited extent. As internationalization very often requires 
norms to be adapted to foreign cultures, it can lead to a plurality or a dilution of norms, destabilizing 
social relations within the family. Internationalization often requires foreign assignments of family 
managers and the increase of physical and cultural distance reduces interactions among family 
members. Similarly, with increasing internationalization the density (closure) of the social network 
diminishes. Increasing cultural distance, that implies differences in values, mindsets, and norms as 
well as losses in coordination, information and communication that comes with international 
diversification (Gomez‐Mejia, Makri, & Kintana, 2010), very likely mitigates the formation of 
family social capital. Moreover, family managers are less likely to be able to leverage enhanced 
trust throughout the firm as trustworthiness has been shown to decline when individuals are from 
different countries (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman et al., 2000). At lower levels of international 
diversification the existence of strong norms, values, trust and relationships among family members 
may remain sustainable and help limit some of the managerial complexities associated with 
internationalization. As international diversification increases it will, however, become more and 
more difficult to sustain the extent of interaction and interdependence required to maintain the 
advantages of family based social capital (Arregle et al., 2007; Pearson et al., 2008). As a 
consequence, family social capital will be less of a unique advantage in more highly internationally 
diversified firms.  
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While international diversification can therefore reduce the potential benefits offered by family 
managers, the opportunities provided by greater involvement of professional managers are 
enhanced even when their selection takes family fit into consideration. International activities 
require “specific social capital in the form of managerial knowledge and capabilities” (D’Angelo 
et al., 2016), as strategies have to be adapted to local markets and financial and risk management 
become more complex. Hence, internationally diversified firms will benefit from professional 
management more likely to contribute such social capital (Sciascia, Mazzola, Astrachan et al., 
2012), providing the firm with the range of social capital and managerial resources needed to seize 
and exploit opportunities in international markets (Liang, Wang, & Cui, 2014). Particularly in the 
context of international diversification businesses will benefit from the greater involvement of 
more ‘cosmopolitan’ professional managers (Westhead, Cowling, & Howorth, 2001). These 
advantages generated by the larger pool of professional managers are likely to become more 
pronounced as the level of internationalization increases.  
In firms with a greater proportion of professional managers in the TMT, there are therefore more 
opportunities to bring in managers with appropriate human and social capital. Senior management 
teams that involve professional managers to a greater extent are less homogenous (Chang et al., 
2015; Ling & Kellermanns, 2010) extending the range of managerial human and social capital 
required to manage the complexity of an internationally diversified firm (Bennedsen, Nielsen, 
Perez-Gonzalez et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010) as well as increasing the diversity of 
information, perspectives and expertise available for decision-making which is particularly 
important in internationally diversified firms (Luo & Chung, 2005; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2008; 
Sciascia et al., 2013). These effects will be reinforced further as with a greater proportion of family 
managers on the TMT other voices are likely to be less influential (Arregle et al., 2012; Leitterstorf 
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& Rau, 2014). Overall, we therefore anticipate that increasing levels of international diversification 
will have a negative impact on the relationship between the involvement of family managers on 
the TMT and performance. Accordingly, we offer the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: International diversification negatively moderates the relationship between the 
proportion of family members in the TMT and performance.  
Family management, performance and product diversification 
Family managers are well positioned to manage narrowly focused businesses as they can rely on 
experience which is locally rooted and grounded in relatively tight sets of relationships and 
communalities (König et al., 2013). The question is whether family managers are also well 
equipped for higher levels of diversification. As with international diversification, product 
diversification will be associated with greater managerial and organizational complexity (Hitt, 
Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2005; Hitt et al., 1997; Jones & Hill, 1988). In contrast to international 
diversification the disruptive impact of product diversification on the human and social capital of 
family managers, is, however, much more limited as it neither involves the same substantial risk 
of disrupting existing close family ties (Arregle et al., 2007) nor the substantial challenges of 
cultural and institutional diversity. As we shall argue the main advantage of family managers in 
this context, their social capital, can therefore be sustained more effectively.  
Nevertheless, increasing diversification levels are associated with increased information 
processing requirements and the need to understand business activities in new markets. This 
requires specific capabilities associated with the management of organizational diversity, the 
allocation of scarce resources and the development of structural configurations that facilitate 
coordination across multiple markets (Chang & Wang, 2007; Franko, 2004; Hitt et al., 1997) which 
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can be accessed more readily through a greater involvement of professional, rather than family 
managers (Fernandez & Nieto, 2006; Muñoz-Bullón & Sánchez-Bueno, 2012). The limitations of 
the human capital of family managers in product-diversified firms are, however, offset by the 
advantages offered by their social capital. Internally to the firm the family managers’ “unique” 
(Arregle et al., 2012: 1122; Minichilli et al., 2010) social capital enhances trust and minimizes 
agency problems within the firm, thus facilitating knowledge exchange and cooperation (Berrone 
et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia, Haynes-Takács, Núñez-Nickel et al., 2007a). The internal social capital 
of family managers thus addresses some of the key challenges associated with the management of 
diversified firms, a factor that may be reflected in recent empirical evidence that suggests that 
family firms are more likely to diversify (Hautz, Mayer, & Stadler, 2013).  
The main advantage of family managers in this context is, however, their external social capital. 
The rich external social capital and external networks, including suppliers and long-term customers 
(Le Breton-Miller et al., 2006; Palmer & Barber, 2001) can be leveraged across multiple product-
market domains, particularly as many key factors are not industry specific (Guillen, 2000). In 
contrast to international diversification, product diversification is also more likely to benefit from 
the exploitation of an established family “name” to both “signal quality” and facilitate “access to 
corridors of power” and other key players in the institutional environment (Bhaumik et al., 2010). 
Notably, the greater reach across industries offered by product diversification can further enhance 
the social capital of family managers and their ability to leverage it effectively. 
Overall, we expect that the benefits of family managers’ internal and, in particular, external, social 
capital will outweigh the benefits of the human capital offered by professional managers in product 
diversified firms. We see three reasons for this. First, as the key challenge in product diversification 
is established by coordination costs, the social capital of managers is particularly effective in 
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limiting these, outweighing possible effects of potential limitations to their human capital. Second, 
the ability of family managers to leverage the advantages of external social capital is dependent on 
location. While in international diversification this can become a disadvantage, this is not the case 
for product diversification. Finally, as we argued above, the selection of professional managers is 
biased and therefore their potential advantages in terms of generic human capital likely to be 
diminished to some extent. We therefore expect that as product diversification increases the 
benefits offered by the involvement of family managers will be enhanced. We expect this effect to 
be present at low levels of product diversification but to strengthen with increasing levels of product 
diversification as the advantages of family managers can be leveraged across a wider range of 
product-markets. In contrast to international diversification, we therefore anticipate a positive 
impact on the relationship between the involvement of family managers on the TMT and 
performance and offer the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: Product diversification positively moderates the relationship between the 
proportion of family members on the TMT and performance.  
Method 
Setting and sample 
Our research focuses on the relationship between the relative involvement of family and 
professional managers in the TMT and performance. It examines how the level of a firms’ 
international and product diversification moderates this relationship. We collected data for German 
publicly traded companies between 2000 and 2009. Sample selection was based on the CDAX, 
which covers all domestic companies listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange1. Germany is a 
                                            
1 The CDAX includes all German equities listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange in General and Prime Standard market segments 
and is comprised of large-caps (DAX), mid-caps (MDAX), small-caps (SDAX), and technology stocks (TecDAX) (Deutsche 
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suitable setting for such a study due to the structure of the governance system as well as variance 
in terms of ownership and diversification. Besides small family firms – which are common in most 
countries - Germany also hosts a number of large family firms such as BMW, VW, and Siemens, 
ensuring a distribution across firm size. Finally, the German corporate governance system is 
characterized by a two-tier system, a dual board structure in which there is a separation between 
the management board (Vorstand), the focus of this study, and the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) 
constituted by non-executive board members. Members of the Vorstand are legally and collectively 
responsible for managing the firm with the chief executive officer (CEO) acting as primus inter 
pares. Hence, the Vorstand can be equated with the TMT (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2013). The 
management board is appointed by the supervisory board, which controls and monitors the actions 
of management. The supervisory board is elected at the annual general meeting. This special two-
tier setting allows us to isolate the impact of management while controlling for governance. In line 
with prior literature, companies from the financial sector, utilities, and foreign subsidiaries were 
excluded (Anderson, Duru, & Reeb, 2012; Block, 2009; Matzler, Veider, Hautz et al., 2015). After 
excluding firms with missing data, we ended up with a final unbalanced panel dataset yielding a 
total of 262 firms with 1710 firm-year observations.  
Measures 
Dependent variable: Firm performance is measured by return on assets (RoA) – net operating 
income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. RoA is widely used in strategic 
management and family business research - particularly in non-US settings - to assess top executive 
and family impact on performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Cannella Jr & Shen, 2001; Carpenter, 
                                            
Börse AG, 2010). It represents the full spectrum of the regulated German equities market and serves as indicator of economic 
development and performance.  
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2002; Miller et al., 2013; Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 2000; Wagner et al., 2015). Annual data was 
obtained from the Worldscope database. 
Independent variable: Family management. Many prior studies applied a dichotomous 
definition of family firms vs non-family firms or family management dependent on whether a 
family member serves as CEO or not (Block, 2012). We, in contrast, adopt a continuous measure 
and capture the extent of family involvement in the TMT by the number of family members on the 
management board divided by the total number of management board members (Klein, 2000; 
Matzler et al., 2015). Hereby we include the full variation from 0 to 100% family managers on the 
top management board. This provides us with a more fine-grained understanding of family versus 
professional management. Under German commercial law, all members of the top management 
team, which as discussed above is defined here as the management board (Vorstand), are legally 
and collectively responsible for the management of the corporation and have to be listed in annual 
reports, enabling the consistent identification of the TMT (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2013). Data on 
family members in the TMT was collected annually from the OSIRIS ownership database (Bureau 
Van Dijk). We used annual reports, corporate websites, firm histories and national directories to 
crosscheck and complete the data. 
Moderator variables international and product diversification: A wide variety of measures 
have been used to capture a firm’s international diversification. We rely on the geographic entropy 
measure as one of the most common, valid, and reliable measures to capture a firm’s international 
diversification in terms of both the degree and scope of its international sales activities (Bowen & 
Wiersema, 2005; Capar & Kotabe, 2003; Goerzen & Beamish, 2003; Hitt et al., 1997; Wiersema 
& Bowen, 2007) which has recently been used in studies focusing on the role of professional 
managers in internationalization (D’Angelo et al., 2016). It considers both the number of 
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geographic segments in which a firm operates and the relative importance in sales contributed by 
each geographic segment (Hitt et al., 1997) and is computed as ∑ Pi ln (1/Pi), where Pi is the share 
of a firm’s total sales attributed to geographic region i, and ln (1/ Pi) is the weight of each 
geographic region i. We used annual geographic segment sales data from the Worldscope database, 
supplemented by annual reports, and identified five different geographic regions: Germany, rest of 
Europe, Americas, Asia/Pacific/Africa and Other2. We standardized the measure with its 
theoretical maximum value3. After standardization, the geographic entropy has a minimum value 
of zero for domestic firms, rises with the extent of international diversity and has a maximum value 
of 1. 
Product diversification is measured by the SIC-based entropy index, a measure that has been 
used extensively in the strategic management literature (Bowen et al., 2005; Chakrabarti, Singh, & 
Mahmood, 2007; Wiersema et al., 2007). It captures the extent of product diversity across a firm’s 
activities by considering the number of product segments as well as their relative importance 
(Jacquemin & Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985). It was computed as ∑ Pi ln(1/Pi), where Pi is the share 
of a firm’s total sales attributed to product segment (i), and ln(1/Pi) is the weight of each product 
segment (i) using annual Worldscope segment data from a firm’s sales in each of its 2-digit SIC 
business segments. Again, the measure is standardized by its theoretical maximum4.  Hence, total 
entropy has a value between zero for single business firms and 1 for firms equally diversified across 
10 different product segments.  
                                            
2 The „other“ category is reported as fifth segment in the Worldscope database if firms do not specify a certain region 
or country for a proportion of their sales. 
3 max geographic entropy= 1.6094 based on equal shares of sales in the five geographic segments. 
4 max product entropy = 2.3026 based on equal shares of sales in a maximum of ten different product segments 
which can be reported by the Worldscope database. 
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Control variables: We include firm, industry, and macroeconomic controls in our models. We 
control for family ownership by the portion of ownership stakes held by the family and family 
governance by the number of family members in the company’s supervisory board relative to the 
total number of directors (Klein, 2000). Further, we include a dummy to control for the continued 
involvement of the founder. Data for these variables was taken from the OSIRIS ownership 
database and supplemented by data from annual reports and national directories. In line with 
previous studies our model controls for firm size, age, and capital intensity (Acquaah, 2012; 
Anderson et al., 2003; Miller et al., 2013). We measure firm size by the number of employees. 
Firm age is captured by the natural log of years of existence. Firm capital intensity is determined 
by the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Additional firm level controls include firm risk, 
captured by beta (Chen & Hsu, 2009; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2010; Miller, Le Breton-
Miller, Lester et al., 2007), which was obtained from the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and 
slack resources captured by the ratio of current assets to current liabilities (Bansal, 2005; Strike, 
Jijun, & Bansal, 2006). Finally, we control for prior firm performance, captured by a one year lag 
of return on equity. Annual firm level data was obtained from the Worldscope database. On the 
industry level we control for industry performance (industry RoA), industry size (industry total 
assets), and industry competition. To capture industry competition we follow Bowen and Wiersema 
(2005) and construct a concentration ratio using the size of the four largest firms in terms of sales 
compared to the output of the entire industry. Annual data of industry measures was generated 
based on the 2-digit SIC core industry of the firm across 22 OECD countries. On the macro level 
we controlled for GDP growth and the institutional environment. To account for home country 
institutional environment we drew on seven items5 that capture the development of a country’s 
                                            
5 legal and regulatory framework, government policy transparency, bureaucracy, adaptability of government policy, 
competition legislation, and intellectual property protection and bribing and corruption  
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political and legal institutions as previously used by Delios and Beamish (1999) and La Porta et al. 
(1998). Data was extracted from the annual editions of the World Competitiveness Yearbook 
(World Competitiveness Yearbook, 1993-2010). We calculated variable scores with higher values 
indicating more developed political and legal institutions6.  
Analysis and Results 
To test our hypothesized relationships, we use panel regression analyses employing interaction 
terms. Due to simultaneous causality, endogeneity is a potential issue in our analysis (Bascle, 2008; 
Greene, 2008). Family involvement in the TMT might not only improve performance, but strong 
performance could also influence the desirability of continuing family management involvement 
and control of a firm (Anderson et al., 2003; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). Reverse causality and 
therefore potential endogeneity has previously also been suggested for the relationship between 
performance and diversification strategies (Bowen & Wiersema, 2009; Campa & Kedia, 2002). 
The question whether it is possible to control for all types of potential endogeneity inherent in a 
specific model has become a common debate in management. Considering the difficulties to find 
a sufficient number of appropriate and valid instrument variables – required to control for potential 
endogeneity due to simultaneous causality - and the downsides of an increasingly complex model, 
a recent editorial guideline in the Strategic Management Journal concluded that it is best to identify 
and control for the main endogeneity issue, while acknowledging others as limitations7. Hence, we 
control for potential endogeneity in the relationship between firm performance and family 
management – our focal relationship of interest. To account for this specific form of potential 
                                            
6 As we focus on Germany as home country only, institutional environment only varies across time as political and 
legal institutions gets more and more developed. 
 7 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/%28ISSN%291097-0266/homepage/ForAuthors.html, archived on 
11.12.2013. 
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endogeneity, we apply a two-stages least square (2SLS) fixed effects model with instrumental 
variables (IV) (Bascle, 2008; Greene, 2008). We apply a Hausman-Test to compare fixed- and 
random-effects models (Hausman, 1987). There was no significant difference in the estimates. 
Therefore, we chose the fixed effects specification, as it allows us to account for unobserved firm 
specific characteristics, a further source of potential endogeneity. We follow Anderson et al (2003), 
who suggest the inclusion of measures of firm size and risk as appropriate instruments in the first 
stage of the estimation to account for potential endogeneity between performance and family 
involvement. As Anderson et al (2003) we use the natural log of total assets and the square of the 
natural log of total assets as instruments. Further, we include leverage, calculated as the ratio of 
long-term debt to equity, as additional instrument variable. We use the orthog() option to test 
whether these instruments are appropriately exogenous. The insignificant C statistics for each of 
them (ln(total assets): C=0.844, p= 0.3582; ln(total assets)²: C=0.935, p= 0.3337; leverage: 
C=0.446, p= 0.5044) support the validity of the instruments (Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2003). 
We also instrument the interaction terms between family management and international 
diversification and family management and product diversification by including interactions 
between the two measures of diversification and the three instrument variables. We further tested 
our model for under- and over-identification and weak instruments. Kleibergen-Paap (Kleibergen 
& Paap, 2006), Sargan (Sargan, 1988) and Cragg-Donald statistics (Cragg & Donald, 1993; Stock, 
Wright, & Yogo, 2002) confirm the validity and strength of the chosen instruments and appropriate 
model identification (Baum et al., 2003; Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2007). In order to 
additionally account for potential endogeneity of current year values of family management, 
international diversification, product diversification and moderators, we further lag these variables 
by one year (Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003). In addition, we control for time effects by including 
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year dummies. To account for potential serial correlation we estimate all of our models by using 
kernel-based autocorrelation-consistent (AC) standard errors (Baum, 2006). 
In Table 1 we present descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for the total sample. The 
German sample firms are more diversified internationally than diversified across different 
industries in terms of both average (international diversificationmean=0.4991; product 
diversificationmean=0.1226) and maximum values (international diversificationmax=0.9695; product 
diversificationmax=0.7874). We calculated the variance inflation factors (VIF) for the main 
explanatory variables in preliminary analysis to ensure that multicollinearity is not an issue. The 
VIFs for the independent and moderator variables, remain under 5.40, well below the suggested 
cut off point of 10, which would indicate problems of multicollinearity (Neter, Wasserman, & 
Kutner, 1985). 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
Table 2 summarizes our regression results. The first model shows our base model only including 
the control variables. Model 2 adds the direct effect of family management. We find support for 
hypothesis 1, with a significant positive impact of the proportion of family members in the TMT 
on performance (p<0.01). This positive direct impact remains significant across all models. The 
findings suggest that increasing the proportion of family members by 1%, increases performance 
by 3.58%. Models 3-5 test whether engagement in different diversification strategies moderates 
this relationship between the proportion of family managers and performance by adding the 
interaction terms between family management and international diversification (Model 3) and 
family management and product diversification (Model 4). F-statistics show that model fit 
increases when we consider the moderating role of diversification strategies. Model 5, including 
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both interaction terms, represents our full model. We consistently find a significant negative 
interaction term between family management and international diversification (p<0.05). This 
provides support for our hypothesis 2. With increasing international diversification the positive 
impact of a higher proportion of family members decreases significantly. Hypothesis 3 is also 
supported by the significant positive interaction effect between product diversification and family 
management in model 5 albeit less clear and at a lower level of significance (p<0.10). 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
The nature of these interactions is further illustrated in figure 1. The graphs in this figure represent 
the relationship between family management and performance at different levels of international 
diversification (figure 1a) and product diversification (figure 1b) including their mean level, and 
one and two standard deviations above and below mean level. The interaction plot in figure 1a 
shows the clear weakening effect of increasing international diversification on the positive impact 
of higher proportions of family members in the TMT. Vice versa the positive impact of family 
management on performance is reinforced with decreasing levels of international diversification. 
Figure 1b suggests that the picture is less straightforward in the case of product diversification. 
First, the moderating impact of product diversification is weaker as the variations in slope are lower 
than for international diversification. Second, the positive, reinforcing effect of higher levels of 
product diversification can be observed only if a certain proportion of family members is already 
present in the TMT. In this case, the positive impact of an increasing number of family members 
in the TMT is reinforced with increased product diversity of the firm, while lower levels of product 
diversification have a weakening effect. 
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Robustness checks 
We conducted a number of additional robustness checks to support our findings. The results can 
be obtained from the authors upon request. First, as a number of empirical studies suggest inverted 
u-shaped relationships for product diversification and performance (see Palich et al., 2000 for a 
meta analysis) and for international diversification and performance (Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller et al., 
2006) we tested whether interactions of family management with the squared terms change the 
substance of our results. While the linear interaction with international diversification stays 
significantly negative, the squared interaction term is not significant for international 
diversification. For product diversification, however, the interaction with the squared term is 
significantly negative while the interaction with the linear term remains positive and significant. 
This suggests that there might be a curvilinear, diminishing moderation effect at higher levels of 
product diversification. We will explore this further in our discussion section, using a split sample 
analysis. Second, we ran our models with a subsample where we excluded highly diversified firms, 
i.e. those firms in the top quartile of international and product diversification. The substance of the 
results remains the same, confirming that our results hold when we exclude the most extreme cases. 
Third, we use a measure of family involvement combining family management and family 
governance. This makes our results comparable to countries, which do not share the German two-
tier system. Our results remain the same with the exception of an insignificant interaction term 
between family involvement and product diversification. Finally, we conducted a subsample 
analysis to better understand the impact of family ownership. We first ran our models for all firms 
with family ownership above 50%. Our results stay the same but the coefficients for both family 
management and the interaction terms increase. This suggests that stronger family influence 
enhances the effects of family managers on performance.  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
In this study we find that the overall effect of a higher proportion of family managers on the top 
management team on performance is positive, which is in line with recent empirical findings about 
the direct impact of family managers (Kowalewski, Talavera, & Stetsyuk, 2010; Miller et al., 
2013). More importantly, we show that this relationship is not universally valid but contingent on 
contextual factors. Our findings show that international diversification negatively moderates the 
relationship between family managers and performance. Product diversification on the other hand 
positively moderates this relationship. These results confirm that context and the associated 
strategic choices clearly matter. Our study contributes specifically to the understanding of impact 
of contextual factors on the relationship between family management and performance (Miller et 
al., 2013) by showing how the corporate strategic choices of product and international 
diversification affect this key relationship. More generally, having focused on the benefits of 
human and social capital offered by family and professional managers our study also contributes 
to ongoing work in resource-based theory to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the 
contextual factors shaping the performance benefits of resources (Barney and Mackey, 2016; Teece 
2011; Nyberg, Moliterno, Hale and Leepak 2014). Here we contribute to lines of enquiry that 
extend earlier work that focused primarily on environmental contingencies by focusing on specific 
organisational and strategic characteristics of the firm (Lioukas et al., 2016). 
To extend our understanding of the focal relationships we conducted a comparative subsample 
analysis (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006; Mayer, Stadler, & Hautz, 
2015; Miller et al., 2013). While the interaction term analysis shows how contextual factors such 
as international and product diversification shape the relationship between family management and 
performance, this approach examines directly the performance impact of family managers under 
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specific contextual conditions (Klingebiel & Rammer, 2014; Miller et al., 2013). We formed 
subsamples representing different types of strategic approaches firms can choose in terms of 
international and product diversification: All firms characterized by international diversification 
levels below the sample median were classified as “low international diversification” (836 
observations), those above the sample median as “high international diversification” (845 
observations). All firms characterized by product diversification levels below the sample median 
were classified as “low product diversification” (846 observations), those above the sample median 
as “high product diversification” (826 observations). In addition we classified those in the 3rd 
quartile (between the 50th and 75th percentile) as “moderate product diversification” (397 
observations), and those above the 75th percentile as “very high product diversification”. We added 
these two last subsamples based on quartiles as our robustness checks suggested a possible 
curvilinear moderation effect. It is also a sensible subsample as those firms in the subsample of 
“low product diversification” are single business firms, i.e. they are not diversified at all (see the 
descriptive statistics in Table 3).  
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 and Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
Our sub-sample analysis suggests that family managers perform well at low levels of 
international diversification while they will have a negative impact on performance when 
international diversification levels are high (see Table 4). The sub-sample analysis also suggests 
that the positive impact of family managers is restricted to moderate levels of product 
diversification while very high levels of product diversification lead to a negative impact. The 
advantages of the human capital offered by professional managers seems to be more pronounced 
at very high levels of diversification where it outweighs the advantages family managers have in 
terms of social capital. The findings may also reflect the inability of family managers to stretch 
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their social capital advantages across a particularly wide range of industries. Future studies could 
explore such possible non-linear effects both empirically and conceptually and consider the 
boundary conditions associated with family managers’ social capital.  
Overall, our findings suggest that families and outside investors face a dilemma. Prior research 
argues that the core motivation of families is to retain control of the business and to pass on firm 
and family wealth to later generations (Casson, 1999; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007a; Miller et al., 
2005). International diversification can reduce country specific risk and hence preserve wealth for 
the next generation. For internationalization to generate positive performance outcomes, family 
firms, however, need to involve professional managers in the TMT, reducing family influence. In 
terms of financial performance there may be a choice of either pursuing a strategy that runs counter 
to the frequently espoused strategy of “global-focusing” (Meyer, 2006) or reducing the 
involvement of family managers. In short, in the case of international diversification there is trade-
off between family involvement and performance. With regard to product diversification the 
implications are more nuanced. Here greater involvement of family managers in the TMT offers 
performance benefits at focused firms as well as at moderate levels of product diversification. For 
firms that are highly product-diversified our findings again suggest that the involvement of 
professional managers needs to be increased in order to improve performance.  
The trade-offs and challenges inherent in these complex strategic choices are also reflected in 
previous studies of diversification strategy. Our findings may help to explain that some studies, 
such as those by Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Gomez-Mejia et al. (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010) 
find that family firms are more focused whereas Hautz et al. (2013) show that higher levels of 
family ownership have a negative impact on international but a positive one on product 
diversification. The differences in the findings may reflect different choices by different samples 
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of family firms with regard to the tensions between family involvement in management and the 
pursuit of different patterns of corporate strategy. Although we have focused on the relationship 
between family management and performance our findings thus help shed some light on concerns 
in the literature on diversification and performance. As a recent review paper (Ahuja & Novelli, 
2017) points out, the relationship between diversification and performance is contingent, not 
univocal.  
Conceptually, the dilemma arises out of tensions between the capabilities of family managers as 
underpinned by their managerial and social capital and the interests and the motivational factors 
highlighted by agency and stewardship theories (Miller et al., 2013). This points to opportunities 
for deepening the understanding of the performance impact of family managers by developing an 
integrative approach in which a resource and capability orientated approach is set alongside work 
based on both agency and stewardship theories (Miller et al., 2013). Whereas both agency and 
stewardship theory explain the possible differential impact of family managers by considering their 
specific sets of preferences and interests, the focus on managerial capital highlights the capability 
of managers to act on their interests. Such an integrative perspective has recently been suggested 
by Chrisman et al. (2015) who explore how configurations of ability and willingness of family 
managers impacts on firm innovation. While Chrisman et al. (2015) define ability in terms of 
discretion we suggest that a focus on the resources and capabilities that the managers contribute to 
the firm, such as the managerial and social capital considered in this paper, can further enrich such 
an approach.  
Our findings point to a number of possible areas for further research. First, from a family 
perspective it would be important to understand how the social and human capital of family 
managers can be developed through the right type of experience and education in order to enhance 
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their contribution to a TMT. For example, an interesting question would be whether family 
managers with relevant international experience can have a positive impact on performance in 
highly internationalized firms. A related question could be whether family managers can transfer 
learning gained during diversification to internationalization and vice versa. Recent research by 
Mayer et al. (2015) suggests that is possible as they showed that firms diversify along both 
dimensions when they are experienced in either product or international diversification. The 
integrative approach points at fruitful areas of enquiry by facilitating research on, for example, the 
conditions under which family managers are more likely to invest in the development of capital 
and capabilities that may overcome any disadvantages. Micro-level studies can thereby illuminate 
if and how idiosyncratic interests and motivations interact with the development of the social and 
human capital of individual family managers. 
Second, future studies could combine the focus on the extent of family involvement on the top 
management with the nuanced perspectives being developed with regard to the diversity of TMTs 
and management boards (e.g. Sundaramurthy et al., 2014) by accounting for overall patterns of 
demographic, educational and experience characteristics in the top management board. A question 
that could be explored here is if there are particular combinations of family and professional 
managers on TMTs that can generate a positive impact on performance. Other research 
opportunities lie in exploring the effects of changes in the strategic context, and in the associated 
strategic choices. Specifically, work could track the performance implications of changes in a 
firm’s corporate strategy, notably a reduction in the level of international diversification, whilst 
maintaining family involvement in the TMT, and vice versa. 
A limitation of our study is its use of a specific sample of publicly traded German companies, 
neglecting non-listed privately held family firms and its particular focus on a specific national 
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context where historical, economic and cultural conditions may have affected the nature of family 
managers’ human and social capital. Future research could therefore consider different national 
contexts and smaller firms which are not listed. The listed nature and the large size of firms in our 
sample are important characteristics which we could expect to have an influence on firm strategy. 
Whether smaller non-listed family firms behave in the same manner is a question that deserves 
further attention. Another limitation of our work is that we did not measure human and social 
capital directly. Hence, human and social capital remain a black box that needs further 
investigation. An option could be the investigation of social networks across industries and 
countries through board appointments of managers. Managerial incentives and the role of 
institutional investors could play a role here as well. Human capital could potentially be captured 
by the personal experience of managers. Unfortunately, none of this data was available for our 
study. In addition, our findings are limited by the statistical method we applied.  
Overall our study enhances the understanding of the contextual factors that affect the relationship 
between family management and performance (Miller et al., 2013). We demonstrate that key 
strategic decisions relating to a firm’s corporate strategy and the involvement of family and 
professional managers in the TMT are interdependent in terms of their effect on performance. More 
generally, our findings suggest that decisions about corporate strategy and the configuration of the 
TMT should not be considered in isolation. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics and Correlations: Total sample 
                                              
  variable mean s.d. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
                                              
(1) Firm Performance 0.01 0.17 1.000                                     
(2) Family Management 0.14 0.23 -0.1110* 1.000                                   
(3) International Div 0.50 0.26 0.1004* -0.1881* 1.000                                 
(4) Product Div 0.12 0.15 0.0707* -0.1646* 0.1691* 1.000                               
(5) Family Ownership 0.28 0.28 0.0142 0.2926* -0.1261* -0.0705* 1.000                             
(6) Family Governance 0.09 0.14 0.0001 -0.0196 -0.0185 0.0312 0.3998* 1.000                           
(7) Founder 0.66 0.47 -0.1046* 0.1685* -0.0702* -0.0627* -0.3926* -0.0874* 1.000                         
(8) Firm Age 60.50 53.83 0.1625* -0.3133* 0.2835* 0.1935* -0.0806* -0.1338* -0.2960* 1.000                       
(9) Firm Age (log) 1.56 0.49 0.2155* -0.3213* 0.2473* 0.1642* -0.0348 -0.0758* -0.2930* 0.9052* 1.000                     
(10) Firm Capital Intensity 0.18 0.57 -0.0173 -0.0166 -0.0096 0.0005 0.0465 0.0482* -0.0574* 0.0027 0.0075 1.000                   
(11) Firm Beta 0.61 0.28 -0.1578* 0.0648* 0.1813* 0.024 -0.1440* -0.0759* 0.1717* -0.1923* -0.2561* -0.0504* 1.000                 
(12) Firm Size 17067 58805 0.0415 -0.1604* 0.2192* 0.2895* -0.1218* -0.0863* -0.0994* 0.1714* 0.1425* -0.0264 0.2454* 1.000               
(13) Firm Slack resources 2.18 2.04 -0.0819* 0.1294* -0.0684* -0.1170* 0.0430 0.0849* 0.0704* -0.0838* -0.1279* 0.0700* -0.0024 -0.1404* 1.000             
(14) Prior Firm Performance -3.02 44.59 0.3486* -0.0357 0.1210* 0.0867* 0.0200 0.0233 -0.1025* 0.1498* 0.1658* -0.0282 -0.0567* 0.0786* 0.0619* 1.000           
(15) Industry Performance 0.67 4.34 0.1441* -0.0630* 0.0393 0.0653* -0.0794* -0.0553* -0.0893* 0.1584* 0.1806* -0.0049 -0.0938* 0.0720* -0.0616* 0.1423* 1.000         
(16) Industry Size 1215962 1524995 0.0610* -0.1805* 0.1941* 0.2015* -0.0581* -0.0974* -0.1241* 0.2449* 0.2589* 0.0347 0.0896* 0.3930* -0.1343* 0.1116* 0.2067* 1.000       
(17) Industry Size (log) 13.88 0.95 0.0326 -0.0151 -0.037 0.0021 -0.0106 -0.0384 -0.0021 0.0279 0.0237 -0.0169 -0.0153 0.0227 -0.0157 0.031 0.013 0.0285 1.000     
(18) Industry Competition 32.54 14.11 -0.0598* 0.0479* -0.2674* 0.0523* 0.0852* 0.0151 -0.0429 -0.1099* -0.1071* -0.007 -0.0333 0.0884* 0.0351 -0.0335 0.029 -0.01 0.0305 1.000   
(19) GDP Growth 1.45 1.24 0.0428 0.0361 -0.0082 -0.0011 -0.0379 0.0114 -0.0026 0.0036 0.0046 -0.036 -0.0381 0.0048 0.0251 0.1532* 0.2300* 0.047 0.044 0.0166 1.000 
(20) Institutional Development 5.32 0.52 -0.1310* 0.0463 -0.0002 0.1079* 0.0586* 0.0019 0.0172 0.0422 0.0058 0.0395 -0.0243 0.0159 0.0662* -0.0174 -0.2723* -0.0551* 0.0417 0.0565* 0.1885* 
                       
                                              
N = 1710 observations; * p<0.05,  
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Table 2: Moderating effect of international and product diversification on the family management and 
performance relationship  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Family Ownership -0.008 -0.841** -0.538*** -0.606*** -0.433*** -0.491** 
Family Governance -0.029 1.423** 0.919*** 1.003** 0.729*** 0.825** 
Founder 0.000 -0.392** -0.235** -0.275*** -0.177** -0.184** 
Firm Age 0.050 0.743** 0.490*** 0.533** 0.387** 0.381** 
Firm Capital Intensity 0.005 -0.022 -0.014 -0.016 -0.012 -0.016 
Firm Risk -0.079*** -0.074 -0.084** -0.077* -0.088*** -0.086** 
Firm Size -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Firm Slack Resources 0.007*** 0.019** 0.014** 0.014** 0.011** 0.011** 
Prior Frim Performance 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Industry Performance 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 
Industry Size 0.005 -0.006 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 0.000 
Industry Competition -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
GDP Growth 0.000 0.008 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.002 
Institutional Development -0.033 -0.253** -0.171** -0.184** -0.135** -0.134** 
Product Diversification -0.020 -0.036 -0.037 -0.291 -0.313 -1.167** 
International Diversification -0.189*** -0.563*** -0.199 -0.435*** -0.092 -0.180 
       
Family Management  3.580*** 2.769*** 2.419*** 2.235*** 2.327*** 
Family Management x 
International Diversification 
  -1.194*  -1.381** -2.897* 
Family Management x 
Product Diversification 
   1.410 1.504* 7.529** 
International Diversification²      0.062 
Product Diversification²      1.486* 
Family Management x 
International Diversification² 
     2.088 
Family Management x 
Product Diversification² 
     -13.536** 
Observations 1710 1710 1710 1710 1710 1710 
F 5.927*** 0.974 1.925*** 1.509* 2.423*** 1.930*** 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics and Correlations: Sub Sample Analysis 
 
 
                                      
    
Low 
International 
Diversification 
  
High International 
Diversification 
  
Low Product 
Diversification 
  
High Product 
Diversification 
  
Medium Product 
Diversification 
>50<75 quart 
  
Very High Product 
Diversification 
>75 quart 
  
Variable mean s.d.   mean s.d.   mean s.d.   mean s.d.   mean s.d.   mean s.d. 
                                      
(1) Firm Performance 0.00 19.19   0.02 13.80   0.00 20.21   0.02 12.90   0.01 14.61   0.03 10.03 
(2) Family Management 0.18 0.26   0.10 0.20   0.17 0.25   0.11 0.21   0.13 0.22   0.08 0.18 
(3) International Div 0.28 0.16   0.72 0.11   0.48 0.26   0.53 0.26   0.48 0.28   0.58 0.23 
(4) Product Div 0.10 0.14   0.14 0.17   0.00 0.00   0.25 0.13   0.15 0.07   0.35 0.10 
(5) Family Ownership 0.33 0.29   0.24 0.26   0.28 0.26   0.28 0.29   0.32 0.30   0.24 0.28 
(6) Family Governance 0.10 0.15   0.08 0.13   0.09 0.14   0.09 0.15   0.08 0.12   0.11 0.18 
(7) Founder 0.68 0.47   0.63 0.48   0.69 0.46   0.62 0.48   0.59 0.49   0.66 0.48 
(8) Firm Age 45.55 44.80   75.24 57.19   49.94 50.74   71.50 54.97   72.75 50.61   70.77 59.22 
(9) Firm Age (log) 1.44 0.45   1.67 0.50   1.45 0.49   1.66 0.47   1.72 0.39   1.61 0.53 
(11) Firm Capital Intensity 0.18 0.53   0.19 0.61   0.17 0.61   0.20 0.54   0.23 0.62   0.17 0.44 
(10) Firm Beta 0.56 0.26   0.65 0.28   0.62 0.29   0.60 0.26   0.58 0.26   0.61 0.26 
(12) Firm Size 6407 26534   27651 77218   4752 12465   30337 81623   33071 92624   27816 68783 
(13) Firm Slack resources 2.29 2.61   2.04 1.23   2.42 2.33   1.93 1.66   1.86 1.64   1.92 1.27 
(14) Prior Firm Performance -7.04 46.24   1.41 41.68   -5.24 46.16   -0.70 43.43   -4.65 48.89   4.31 33.15 
(15) Industry Performance 0.45 4.42   0.92 4.24   0.58 4.19   0.75 4.54   0.62 4.10   0.97 4.97 
(16) Industry Size 959701 966306   1473316 1898972   884493 891659   1568375 1925559   1757378 2227415   1395336 1551177 
(17) Industry Size (log) 13.88 0.91   13.87 0.97   13.87 0.96   13.88 0.92   13.93 0.93   13.84 0.90 
(18) Industry Competition 35.66 13.95   29.43 13.55   31.56 12.78   33.47 15.36   33.68 15.08   33.26 15.57 
(19) GDP Growth 1.46 1.25   1.42 1.24   1.48 1.23   1.39 1.24   1.33 1.23   1.42 1.25 
(20) 
Institutional 
Development 5.31 0.52   5.31 0.52   5.24 0.47   5.37 0.55   5.34 0.55   5.37 0.55 
                                      
  Observations 836     845     846     826     397     406   
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Table 4: Subsample analysis: Impact of Family Management on Performance 
 
 Low 
International 
Div 
High 
International 
Div 
Low 
Product 
Div 
High 
Product Div 
Moderate 
Product Div 
>50<75 quart 
Very high 
Product Div 
>75 quart 
Family Management 1.490*** -4.565* 2.809** -6.292 2.716* -0.927* 
International Diversification -0.424** -0.617 -0.522** -0.289 -0.391 0.096 
Product Diversification 0.122 -0.194  0.013 -0.811 -0.157 
Family Ownership -0.236* 1.148 -0.546** 1.660 -0.760 0.287* 
Family Governance 0.495* -1.618 0.854* -3.415 2.247 -0.176 
Founder -0.103 0.614 -0.523** 0.222 0.175* 0.063 
Firm Age 0.195 -1.092 0.774* -0.434 -0.057 -0.062 
Firm Capital Intensity -0.017 0.041 -0.023 0.067 -0.023 0.003 
Firm Risk -0.010 0.081 -0.050 -0.245 0.044 -0.028 
Firm Size 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
Firm Slack Resources 0.017*** 0.025 0.012 -0.052 0.066* 0.006 
Prior Firm Performance 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Industry Performance -0.002 0.002 -0.000 0.007 -0.007 -0.001 
Industry Size 0.009 0.014 -0.012 -0.007 0.014 0.002 
Industry Competition -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 
GDP Growth 0.008 0.001 -0.003 -0.023 0.044 0.036** 
Institutional Development -0.265** 0.194 -0.326* 0.181 -0.214 -0.006 
Observations 836 845 846 826 397 406 
F 1.376 0.407 0.633 0.335 1.197 1.315 
       
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Figure 1a: Moderating impact of International 
diversification of the relationship between 
family management and firm performance 
Figure 1b: Moderating impact of Product 
diversification of the relationship between 
family management and firm performance 
 
